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Abtract 
 
The EMU assigns a very marginal role to economic policy and relies on the leading idea that, if 
prices are kept constant, there will be an automatic convergence towards long-run equilibrium 
income. These beliefs represent the theoretical underpinnings of fiscal and monetary policy 
strategies in Europe. In order to highlight the weakness of these foundations, the paper evaluates 
empirically the effects of public expenditure and interest rate setting on equilibrium income in Italy 
from 1998 to 2008. The analysis supports the conclusions that government spending has a positive 
impact on national income while inflation targeting has a negative impact. Moreover the empirical 
evidence shows that a high level of debt does not produce negative effects on GDP. Finally, at a 
time of financial crisis, these results appear to be reinforced for fiscal policy, but weakened for 
monetary policy. The paper draws the conclusion that the EMU’s rigid rules for both fiscal and 
monetary policy have recessive attitudes, and limit the use of instruments to deal with high levels of 
unemployment, definitely undermining the future existence of the single-currency area. 
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1. Introduction 
The policy framework of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is based on the principal idea that 
monetary and fiscal policies can be effective only if they follow rigid rules. This leads to a 
subordination of any other policy target to the wider objective of the stability of the Euro. This 
stability is considered to be the necessary condition for long-run convergence towards the natural 
unemployment rate. 
 
The global financial crisis that occurred in 2008 has shown dramatically that sometimes this 
convergence does not happen automatically and has brought economists to consider that policy 
interventions could be necessary to sustain development. The strategy of allowing market forces – 
which, in the long run could lead to steady growth, regional convergence and sound public budgets 
– to operate freely has apparently failed. 
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The European policy framework relies on the conclusion that, following the rational expectation 
hypothesis, “only unanticipated money matters” (Lucas 1972, Sargent and Wallace 1975, Kydland 
and Prescott 1977) and that public expenditure just creates expectations for greater future taxation 
and public debt (Barro 1974). These analytical results have been reinforced by studies underlining 
the immoral behaviour of politicians. They rarely aim to serve the public interest, but often just seek 
to be re-elected: therefore they subordinate decisions about the optimal policy to the consensus 
mechanism (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). 
 
In the EMU, central banks and national governments are denied any active role in influencing 
equilibrium income because: 
1. Short-term policies are not desirable. Even if they could have positive effects in the short-
run, the final result is just an increase of inflation;  
2. Inflation is a monetary phenomenon. It is possible to control the quantity of money in 
circulation to control the inflation rate; 
3. Gross domestic product and unemployment fluctuate around their long-run value. The 
latter is independent of active fiscal and monetary policies; 
These principles are the theoretical foundation of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, whose general content is to ensure that monetary variables do not disturb the 
spontaneous convergence towards the ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU) 
and to help the European Central Bank to reach its goal of price stability (Arestis, McCauley and 
Sawyer 2001, Arestis and Sawyer 2003, 2005). National governments belonging to the EMU are 
obliged to respect rigid parameters and cannot use fiscal policy freely to increase growth and 
employment, or they can use it when not needed2. 
 
However, income and employment are not just supply-side determined, even in the long run3. 
Current events have revived interest in the effectiveness of economic policy, both fiscal and 
monetary. Concerning monetary policy, a central bank moving interest rates is able to influence 
private demand through its effects on both investment and consumption. An inflation-targeting 
policy, in this respect could be very counterproductive because of its indirect influence on aggregate 
demand4. Concerning fiscal policy it still could have an active role – through the Keynesian 
multiplier – in influencing the output growth.  
 
In order to highlight the weakness of the EMU’s policy foundations, the paper evaluates empirically 
the effects of public expenditure and interest rate setting on equilibrium income in Italy from 1998 
to 2008. The empirical analysis supports the conclusions that government spending has a positive 
impact on national income, while inflation targeting has a negative one. Moreover the empirical 
evidence shows that a high level of debt – in contrast with Barro’s (1974) conclusions – did not 
produce negative effects on the level of GDP. Finally, at a time of financial crisis, these results 
appear to be reinforced for fiscal policy, while weakened for monetary policy. 
                                               
2
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must have effects on current output. See Symposium (2002). 
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The paper uses OLS techniques in order to capture the value of the coefficients expressing the 
relevant relations between dependent and independent variables, rather than the much more diffused 
VAR analysis. The VAR time-series technique in fact evaluates the response to shocks to, for 
example, aggregate equilibrium income, while the OLS is able to capture the measure of 
contribution to income of the independent variables. 
 
After considering the empirical results of the Italian experience, the paper finally reflects on the fact 
that EMU’s rigid rules for both fiscal and monetary policy have recessive attitudes and, during a 
period of crisis, in which other market forces do not work, they limit the use of the instruments 
capable of dealing with high levels of unemployment. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section two briefly recalls the theoretical foundations and the 
empirical evidence about the inefficacy of fiscal and monetary policy; section three gives an 
account of the policy events that occurred in Italy before and after joining the EMU single currency 
area. Section four contains the empirical analysis of some indicators of policy interventions from 
1998 to 2008 and is divided into two parts. In the first, through the OLS technique, we evaluate the 
contribution of government spending and interest rate setting to GDP, and in the second part we 
estimate – through the Kalman filter – the measure of this contribution within these ten years. 
Section five derives policy implications from the results.  
 
2. Do policy interventions increase growth? 
The ineffectiveness of economic policy in changing the value of equilibrium income has been 
widely maintained in the economic literature, and to conduct an exhaustive review would require 
much more than a paragraph. Here we would like just to draw some distinctions. 
 
On the side of monetary policy the mainstream literature can be divided into two streams of 
thought. The first refers to Lucas’s critique, which extends very old classical conclusions about the 
long-run neutrality of money, according to which expansive monetary policies have neither short- 
nor long-term effects. On the contrary, it could be destabilizing through the influence on the process 
of formation of prices expectations. All a central bank has to do – as the Taylor rule suggests – is to 
set the interest rate in order to counterbalance any inflationary pressure coming from the market. 
This strategy would assure automatic convergence towards the level of full employment. 
 
The second stream of thought can be termed New Keynesian Macroeconomics (also known as new 
consensus macroeconomics; see Fontana 2009), according to which monetary policy could be 
effective because of labour, goods and credit market rigidities (Blanchard 2008). These rigidities 
“anchor expectations” and monetary policy “can be more activist in the short term” (Peson 2008). 
 
The empirical analysis of the European Central Bank for the Euro area (ECB Working papers from 
no. 91 to no. 114) supports these conclusions because (a) monetary policy decisions appear to have 
temporary effects; (b) these effects decrease as long as time goes on; (c) prices effects are lasting 
even if reduced at the beginning; (d) apparent initial real effects are due to prices and wages 
stickiness. Despite Lucas’s (1977) well-known conclusion that “only unanticipated money matters”, 
there is a relevant body of empirical literature that is not consistent with this, even among consensus 
economists. For instance, Cochrane (1998) finds that monetary policy has real effects even if it is 
expected. This result is reinforced by the famous contributions of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999 
and 2000) and Galì and Gertler (2007), who find that – because of imperfect competition – it can be 
effective to reduce unemployment, without leading to higher inflation.  
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Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1999) show that the practice of setting interest rates could 
have recessive influences when the inflation rate, actual and expected, is very low. This result 
depends on the fact that central banks cannot fix negative interest rates. 
On the side of fiscal policy, the theoretical underpinnings of its inefficacy are: (1) the crowding-out 
effect; (2) Barro’s reinterpretation of the Ricardian equivalence; and (3) the inflationary effect. 
Governments are said to cause interest rates to increase in order to convince the public to buy 
bonds. The increase in interest rates would crowd-out private investment, and cause a reduction in 
the equilibrium income. The final result would be a total or partial offsetting of the effects of the 
increase in public expenditure. As a final point, Robert Barro (1974), revisiting Ricardian 
conclusions about the intertemporal equilibrium between income and expenditure, concluded that 
public expenditure in the present causes expectation of greater future taxation, higher interest rates 
and greater public debt. These expected effects – joined with the circumstance that government 
bonds do not represent wealth – reduce current consumption and offset the increase in income 
generated by the increase in autonomous demand. 
 
In synthesis, any government borrowing to finance public expenditure must be done at the expense 
either of investment or of consumption (Cochrane 2009, Fama 2009). As Krugman says, this is 
“one of the most basic fallacies in economics – interpreting an accounting identity as a behavioural 
relationship […]. An increase of G [public expenditure] doesn’t reduce I [or C] one for one, it 
increases GDP which leads to higher S and T.” (Krugman 2009b). Reich (2009) shares the same 
point of view. 
 
In all these cases, the result is that the monetary policy strategy is of the utmost importance. In fact 
the central bank setting the interest rate influences the macroeconomic performance of fiscal policy 
and the intertemporal equilibrium between present and future consumption through the effects on 
the rate of actualization of future revenues (Canale 2008). The policy rate, set by the monetary 
authority, is in fact the reference value for the all the other interest rates, including the treasury bill 
rate. The latter in turn could diverge from the average of the market according to the country’s 
rating. The point is, therefore, to know whether and in which cases the debt-financed public 
expenditure can reduce the country’s rating. Therefore – even if it were possible to overcome the 
other limits of these contributions5 – whether or not the crowding-out effect or the Barro-Ricardo 
theorem applies depends for the great part on the action of monetary policy (Canale, Foresti, Marani 
and Napolitano 2008). 
 
As a final point if fiscal policies increase private demand it is said to cause inflation because of the 
so-called real-balance effect. However, in order to state that an increase in demand causes an 
increase in prices, it has to be that: (a) the supply curve has a positive slope and if so (b) the 
increase in public expenditure does not cause a shift in the supply curve as well. However, very 
often, especially when government intervention is requested, there are a lot of unexploited 
resources, fixed investment is underutilized, and there would be many cases in which the relation 
between wages and productivity remains constant. The supply curve, therefore, could be horizontal 
and increase in demand would not create inflation. 
 
Despite the extensive empirical literature, an unambiguous conclusion has not yet been found even 
in this field. Following the theoretical assumptions, the literature concentrates on the long-run 
possible effects of un-predicted policy interventions and uses different versions of VAR 
approaches. However, many difficulties arise in examining the effects of governmental 
interventions (Perotti 2007): 
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(a) the impossibility of separating the fiscal policy from monetary policy effects 
(b) the endogenity of fiscal policy effects 
(c) the identification of the structure of the economy. 
The most famous contributions are Ramsey and Shapiro (1999) (dummy variable approach), Fatás 
and Mihov (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002). All of these attempt to identify the fiscal 
stimulus separately from the monetary one, and the unexpected interventions from expected ones. 
In fact they all assume – following the intertemporal approach with perfect foresight – that 
anticipated public policy interventions are off-set by private agents.  
 
Fatás and Mihov (2009) document the evolution of fiscal balances in the Euro area. They find that 
because of the absence of discretionary interventions and the use of automatic stabilizers, 
government policies appear to be counter cyclical (i.e., having the opposite sign of output growth) 
and public accounts do not deteriorate, but help convergence towards the  full employment rate (for 
the same point of view, see also Alesina, Campante and Tabellini 2007). 
 
Following a different perspective, Gali and Monacelli (2005) provide an analysis of the effects of an 
exogenous change in government spending in a small open economy belonging to a monetary 
union: an increase in government spending always raises output and the price level in the short run. 
Many critiques on the approach denying the positive effects of fiscal policy interventions can be 
found on a special number of Oxford Review of Economic Policy (vol. 21(4), 2005) entirely 
dedicated to the macroeconomic role of government spending (see Allsopp and Vines 2005, 
Krugmann 2005, Solow 2005). Furthermore Kirsanova, Stehm and Vines (2005) find that, in 
modern policy regimes under which fiscal and monetary policy are independent, economic policy in 
a single country gives better results if both authorities cooperate to reach their goals. 
 
 
3. Policy actions in Italy before and after joining the EMU (1992–2008) 
The period from 1992 to 2008, was characterized by independent monetary policies and fiscal 
strategies oriented to the reorganization of public accounts in order to respect the Maastricht 
parameters and the Stability and Growth Pact. However the entire period can be divided into two 
parts – before and after 1998 – in relation to the adoption of the single currency. In the first period 
the policies, although autonomous, were in accordance with the objective of joining the Euro area, 
while the policies in the second period, as it is well known, were qualified by the transfer of 
monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank and by a fiscal policy action inside strict limits 
due to the pre-existence of fiscal imbalances.  
3.1 Fiscal and monetary conditions in Italy after the ERM crisis: 1992–1998 
In the 1970s and the early 1980s Italy experienced high inflation rates, but by 1992 inflation 
remained stable at approximately 5% for many years due to the dis-inflationary policy of the central 
bank. In fact in 1981 the Bank of Italy started its “divorce” from the Italian Treasury (it was no 
longer forced to act as a residual claimant of unsold Italian Treasury debt securities) and used 
interest rates to preserve the  participation of Italy to the ERM.  
 
At the beginning of 1990s, the process of German reunification, and the effects on internal income 
of the policy of increasing interest rates, brought the 1992 currency crisis (Canale, Montagnoli and 
Napolitano 2008). Unfortunately the higher rates of discount of preceding years, despite the 
progress in terms of inflation, caused an ever-increasing  deterioration of fiscal accounts. If the debt 
was 100% of GDP in 1992, it continued to grow rapidly; interest payments generated a vicious 
spiral and an ever-increasing burden on the budget. The large fiscal adjustment of 6% of GDP, 
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approved by the government after the 1992 crisis, was only able to slow down the rate of growth of 
the debt.  
 
During 1996, it became increasingly clear that a strict adherence to the limit of a 3% deficit-to-GDP 
ratio in 1997 would be required of countries to be admitted to the European Monetary Union. To 
steer markets towards favourable expectations, in 1996 the Italian government (under Prime 
Minister Romano Prodi) increasingly stressed a commitment to the fiscal discipline needed to enter 
the EMU, and in the autumn of 1996, a carefully crafted fiscal package of spending cuts and tax 
increases was approved. The size of the fiscal adjustment of 1996 was much smaller than the one 
that was approved in the wake of the 1992 crisis, and it was just enough to tip the markets into 
believing that Italy would be able to join the EMU.  
 
Figure 1. Macroeconomic performance of fiscal and monetary policy in Italy from 1992 to 
1998 
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Source: IFM-Financial Statistics, ECB 
 
Figure 1 shows the behaviour of the monetary policy instrument (rep_rate), inflation rate 
(inflation), the growth rate of income (gdpgrowth) and fiscal balance (deficit) in the period 
considered. The behaviour of the line representing the GDP path clearly illustrates the periods of 
recession (1992) and slow-down of the economy (1995). It also shows that, starting from 1998, the 
growth of the Italian economy declined, reaching almost the value of zero. Except for the years 
1995-96, when the economy was growing at 5% due to the increase of exports via devaluation of 
the exchange rate, Italy experienced very low rates of growth. The inflation rate depicts a negative 
trend that, in 1998, reached the value of about 2.5%. The interest rate converged towards the value 
of 3% at the end of 1998 as required for joining the EMU by the prescriptions of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Finally, the deficit had non-negative values just at the beginning of 1998, but its trend 
during the whole period is guided by the target of fiscal balance. 
 
3.2 Fiscal and monetary conditions in Italy after the ERM crisis: 1999–2008 
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In 1998 Italy joined the EMU and the Bank of Italy was reflected first by European Monetary 
Institute  and then at the launch of the Euro by the European Central Bank. The following years can 
be divided into two period. The first goes from 1999 to the end of 2001, when Italy experienced a 
relative high rate of growth. The second was characterized by two global shocks, the first in 2001, 
whose symbol is the events of 9/11, and the second the global financial crisis that started with the 
bursting of the US housing bubble at the end of 2007. 
 
 
 Figure 2. Output growth in Italy from 1999 to 2008 
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Source: IFM-Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the growth rate of income for Italy after the EMU. The average rate was about 
0.6%, with peaks of 2.5% and -3.2%. However, it was much below the 5.26% consistent with the 
optimistic expectations of the European Commission when it fixed the ceiling level of 3% of ratio 
of deficit/GDP in order to ensure a convergence towards a stable management of public debt6. 
 
This condition of instability has been shared by many other EMU countries. In Figure 3 we plot the 
general government primary balance as percentage of GDP for Ireland, Italy, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Germany and France. Except for Ireland – whose positive economic 
conditions in that period are well-known – all the EU countries experienced difficulties in managing 
the ratio of deficit/GDP. In Italy (thick yellow line), the ratio always remains negative, despite the 
hard fiscal policy retrenchments set in the periods 1999-2000 and 2006-20077.  
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Figure 3. Public deficit in the Euro Area 
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Table 1 summarizes the main stability programmes proposed by the Italian government after the 
launch of the Euro. In the light of the considerations made above, it is clear that they failed in their 
aims. In fact, reading the table from left to right and from top to bottom we observe that the 
programmed levels of debt and deficit are never respected. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  
Confirming the initial strategy of fiscal discipline set in the Maastricht Treaty, and guided by the 
idea that sound public finances is a precondition for economic development, in the year 2000 the 
European Commission passed the following sentence on the Italian government:  
 
The Council urges Italy firmly to commit itself to respect the programme’s objectives. 
Primary surpluses should remain at the high levels projected in the programme. Any 
deviation from the planned deficit and primary surplus outcomes should be promptly 
addressed and corrective measures taken. This should be ensured through a tight control 
of current primary expenditure. The Council encourages Italy to accompany the reduction 
in the ratio of current primary expenditure to GDP with a more effective and more 
comprehensive rationalisation of public spending, aimed at improving the supply-side 
conditions of the economy. Moreover, even though Italy fulfils the requirements of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, it should take every opportunity to improve future budgetary 
targets and speed up the consolidation process, in order to accelerate the reduction of the 
government debt ratio. The Council recommends that future decisions to reduce the tax 
and social security contributions  burden  should  be  matched  by  offsetting expenditure 
cuts8. 
 
The reorganization of fiscal accounts is explicitly considered an objective to be reached as soon as 
possible as a precondition for economic development. The sentence quoted above explains that, for 
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in EMU, no. 3, 2001, p. 148. 
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the European Commission, the reduction of the taxation and social security contributions via cuts in 
the government’s expenditure could have a positive effect on the economy. Unfortunately, Italy’s 
macroeconomic performance in the decade after 1999 dramatically worsened relative to the average 
of the other members of the Euro area. In the early 1990s, the vigorous increase in exports 
compensated the weakness of the domestic demand, while in the years after, the fiscal adjustment 
required by EMU and the inflation-targeting strategy of the centralized monetary policy might 
explain the evolution of the macroeconomic performance (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Macroeconomic performance of fiscal and monetary policy in Italy 
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The average growth rate of income was about 0.8% with peaks of 3.2% and -3.5%.  It was a bit 
higher than in the pre-EMU period but still below the 5.6% required to make the debt converge to 
60% of GDP. The discount rate, the main instrument of monetary policy, appears having been 
growing from 1991 to 2001, while decreasing in the years after. At the end of 2005 it starts growing 
again in response to the average inflation dynamic in the EMU. The entire period is also 
characterized by a low level of inflation (2.3% on average) which starts increasing again at the end 
of 2007.  Finally as already shown in Figure 3, the dynamic of public deficit was ever guided by the 
attempt to respect the Stability and Growth Pact, without taking care of its effects on output growth. 
 
Taking a global look at the macroeconomic performance of Italy in these years, we can say that, 
despite the initial positive influence derived from the gain in credibility for having joined the EMU, 
from 2001, the increase in the discount rate is accompanied by a decrease – with some time delay – 
in output growth, and vice versa. Furthermore, in the period 2006–2008, the tight ECB policy was 
associated with a restrictive fiscal policy. The reduction of public funds, especially for education, 
scientific research, innovation, business support, investment, and so on, resulted in significant 
economic decline, triggering a perverse cycle with further negative effects on public accounts9. 
Lacking the private demand because of the crisis, these combined policies hardly influenced the 
sharp decrease of the growth rate of income from 2007. However, empirical results will show that 
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 Moreover, among the various economic fundamentals that contributed to the degradation of the Italian capacity of 
exports, there is also the factor of labour productivity. For Italy and Spain, that productivity has remained essentially 
unchanged  from 1999 to 2008. Conversely, it increased considerably in France (+9.6%) and Germany (+9.5%), which 
contributed to increase the average level of the EMU (+7.7%). 
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without the ever-reduced level of public expenditure, the macroeconomic performance would have 
been worse than it was.  
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 The theoretical model 
The model we use for the empirical analysis follows the theoretical assumption that current income 
is the result of the effects of the components  of aggregate demand. Because we do not suppose that 
current income is simultaneously determined by its components, our model is represented by the 
following: 
 
( )t t iY f Z −=           (1) 
 
Where t iZ −  synthesizes the lagged variables influencing gross domestic product. 
The value of the index t i−  varies in relation to the lags considered to be relevant in influencing 
current income: 
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Where the first index indicates the independent variable, while the second the time lag considered, 
so that it can be i = 1, 2, 3… 
We can rewrite our model as: 
 
0 1 1, 2 2, 3 3, ,.......t t i t i t i n n t iY z z z zβ β β β β− − − −= + + + + +       (2) 
 
In order to study  the influence of monetary and fiscal policy separately and avoid problems of 
autocorrelation – very difficult to overcome in these cases – we consider one variable at a time so 
that we estimate the value of each coefficient:  
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or, as one would say, ceteris paribus. 
 
As noted in the introductory section, we use the OLS technique since it better captures the effects of 
the components of aggregate demand on equilibrium income in the short run, taking into account not 
only the deviation from the original path, but especially the overall contribution to equilibrium 
income. As a final step we examine the variation of the coefficients weight over time. Using the 
Kalman filter technique we evaluate during the time interval considered the way in which fiscal and 
monetary policy has influenced the value of GDP. 
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4.2 Empirical results 
 
The time interval is ten years, from 1998 to 2008, and data are from ISTAT and IMF databases 
quarterly adjusted. The chosen time period is based on the effective launch of the EMU, which took 
place in January 1998 with the creation of the European Central Bank. 
 
Our first estimate concerns the effects of public expenditure on gross domestic product (Table 2). 
The dependent variable GDP1 represents the nominal index number of gross domestic product, 
while Tex represents the nominal index number of total government expenditure. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
We consider a one-period time lag. The empirical results show that the public expenses in Italy of 
the previous period had a positive correlation with nominal current income from 1998 to 2008. In 
order to overcome the criticism that the effect is just nominal, the regression is repeated using as a 
dependent variable the real index of GDP, GDP2, derived by dividing GDP1 by the consumer price 
index. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 shows that  nominal government expenditure produces real effects, albeit reduced. 
The results do not change significantly if we consider the effects of total expenditure and total 
revenues on GDP. We consider three-lags for total revenues in order to avoid problems of 
correlations. Table 4 contains the effects on nominal GDP of monetary expenses of the previous 
period and monetary value of revenues of three periods before, while Table 5 studies the real 
effects. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results show that, after introducing total revenues as control variables, the effects of government 
expenditure are still positive and that the fiscal pressure does not produce reductions of GDP either  
in nominal or in real terms. Note that independent variables do not show autocorrelation (see D-W 
Statistics).  
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Tables 6 and 7 evaluate the effects of the European Central Bank monetary policy strategy on 
internal income expressed in terms of real index. The dependent variable is the real index of GDP,  
GDP2, while the independent variable in the discount rate in Table 6 and the Euro overnight index 
average in Table 7. The discount rate  – set by the central bank – is the lowest rate it is possible to 
find in the market, i.e., the floor of the interest rate corridor, and represents the reference value of all 
the re-financing operations of the economy. We see in Table 6 that the sign of the coefficient is 
negative.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Looking at the Euro overnight index average, we observe negative effects on  real GDP. Thus we 
can confirm that – because of the direct proportionality between the interest rates the central bank 
sets and the average rates the monetary and financial institutions apply – in the years considered, 
monetary policy had a negative effect on GDP. 
 
 [Table 7 about here] 
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Finally, despite all the suggestions coming from the theoretical literature about public debt, evidence 
emerging from Italian data shows that the level of debt has effects of the same sign on the real GDP 
index (Table 8)  
[Table 8 about here] 
 
These results appear to operate in a sense opposite to Barro’s theoretical conclusions about the 
public bonds wealth effect. 
 
 
4.3 Incidence of policies through time ( the Kalman filter) 
 
In this final section we implement the Kalman filter methodology. This algorithm, which provides the 
recursive estimation of unobserved, time-varying parameters or variables in the system contingent 
on all available information, will allow us to investigate further the behaviour of coefficients of the 
policy variables. The reason for applying the Kalman filter at this stage is that this time-varying 
methodology is able to recover unobservable factors related to fiscal and monetary policy that could 
have affected Italian GDP from 1998 to 2008, i.e.,  to detect how the respective coefficients have 
changed over time10. 
 
Assuming that βi,t is determined by an autoregressive process AR(n), we apply the following time- 
varying parameters model: 
 
 t 0 ,t 1 ,t t tiy = β + β Z +µ      (3)     
Where yt is the GDP at time t, µit is an independent white noise, the vector of coefficients βi,t is 
assumed to be random walks. This can be written in state space form where the observation equation is 
given by the expression in (3) above and the state equations are given by: 
 
 
0, 1, 0, 0,0.
1, 1, 1, 1,1.
...1 0
...0 1
t t n tt
t t n tt
β β µβ
β β µβ
− −
− −
= +
      
      
      
 (4) 
 
The above eq. (4) is the measurement equation in which βit and µit are [n×1] vectors11.  The relevant 
results and estimates are reported in Table 9 and in Figures 5 and 6. 
 
The coefficients have the correct signs and are highly significant. Overall, the patterns of the 
coefficients βit (see Figures 5 and 6) seem to add insightful elements to the analysis of the dynamics 
of the fiscal and monetary variables over the period.  
 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
                                               
10
 “[...] when the disturbances and the initial state vector are normally distributed, it enables the likelihood function to be 
calculated via what is known as the prediction error decomposition. This opens the way for estimation of any unknown 
parameters in the model.” (Harvey 1991, p. 10). 
11
 For a more complete explanation of the Kalman filter approach, the state space form and the measurement and 
transition equations, see Harvey (1989). 
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Figure 5.  Monetary policy coefficient behaviour 
 
Indeed, it is interesting to observe (Figure 5) that a significant change in the pattern of the 
coefficients b (the interest rate) occurs a few years after the introduction of the Euro. The 
coefficient on government expenditure, which has been steadily increasing over time, becomes 
stable around the end of the period.  
 
Another change in the pattern, around 2006, is also shown by the coefficient on the interest rate 
moving from a negative to a positive trend. This change and the value of this coefficient suggest 
that the effect of the monetary policy instrument started to adjust in anticipation of the financial 
crises. The adjustment took place well before the crisis was officially accepted. Not surprisingly the 
coefficient on the interest rate does not show a positive value. It moves to a value close to zero at 
the end of 2008. This represents a kind of proof of the fact that in a time of crisis monetary policy is 
unable to stabilize output. The lowering of interest rates cannot inject money into private markets if 
it cannot be used productively. 
 
Figure 6. Fiscal policy coefficient behaviour 
 
 
 
At the other extreme, the coefficient on the government expenditure shows positive dynamics over 
the whole period (Figure 6). To a more careful interpretation, this pattern should not be surprising 
since the β1 coefficient captures the effect on GDP of actual government expenditure. The analysis 
shows that the introduction of the Euro has implied a stronger impact of the fiscal variable and less 
stable coefficients for the monetary variable.  
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5. Policy structure and the future of EMU 
 
European policy framework relies on two pillars: (1) a monetary policy with the final aim of stable 
inflation, and (2) rigid fiscal rules relegating government action to a very marginal role. While these 
two pillars appeared to be of benefit for Italy in the period preceding the Euro, in the latter phase, 
especially during the last five years, they seem to have weakened Italy’s economic growth. 
 
From our empirical analysis it emerges that fiscal policy in this last ten years had effects of the same 
sign on growth and that the centralized monetary policy was not neutral in relation to the effect on 
GDP. These effects appeared to be reinforced when the components of aggregate demand linked to 
private choices were lacking, i.e., over a financial crisis. In particular, examining the influence of 
public expenditure on growth through time we observe an increasing value, demonstrating that 
government spending had a central role in sustaining demand.  
 
Examining then the effects of monetary policy, it is possible to conclude that the interest rate setting 
practice had not only anti-inflationary effects, but also real effects. However, the power of 
influencing the economic performance of Italy in periods of crisis appeared to be very weak, 
because of the impossibility of injecting money into the market when it is not desired, i.e., when 
aggregate demand is lacking.  
 
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the European policy framework was not built to confront the recent 
depression because it relies exclusively on the action of the market. We can add that the absence of 
fiscal instruments and the centralized monetary action cultivate the seeds of a further instability 
because of the non-neutrality of monetary policies. In short, the European policy framework 
subordinates employment and growth to sound public finance and price stability. However, the 
experience of the global economic crisis has shown that containing  inflation, deficit and public debt 
is not enough to fight unemployment.  On the contrary, the unique objective of the internal stability 
of the currency ultimately weakens the existence of the EMU. Like any fixed exchange rate system, 
if the costs of preserving the parity are too high, the existence of the agreements will appear to be at 
risk (Krugman 2009a). 
 
The Euro’s future, therefore, should be accompanied by the creation of a common fiscal policy 
authority to act side by side with the European Central Bank, and identify tools to support shared 
growth. This result can only be achieved, however, if Europe becomes politically united. The 
drafters of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, in our opinion, have forgotten 
that it was a final link in a chain starting from the Treaties of Paris and Rome, whose underlying 
motivations are political. The mainstream prescriptions, on the contrary, rely on the belief that the 
political union is the natural result of converging economies. 
 
However, income growth and full employment is not the spontaneous result of the market, but rather 
of economic policy action, both fiscal and monetary: of monetary policy because the central bank, 
changing interest rates, acts on demand through both investments and consumption, and fiscal policy 
since it has an active role through the Keynesian multiplier, whose ineffectiveness has never found 
an evidence-based proof. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Key figures of Italy’s stability programmes (2000–2008) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
Italian stability programme (2001–04) 
General 
government 
balance 
 
– 0.8 
 
– 0.5 
 
0 
 
0.3 
       
 
Primary 
balance 
 
5.3 
 
5.5 
 
5.6 
 
5.5 
       
 
Government 
debt 
 
106.6 
 
103.5 
 
99.6 
 
94.9 
       
 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
 
2.9 
 
3.1 
 
3.1 
 
3.1 
       
 
Italian stability programme (2002–06) 
General 
government 
balance 
 
 
-2.1 
 
-1.5 
 
-0.8 
 
-0.2 
 
0.1 
     
 
Primary 
balance 
 
 
3.8 
 
4.5 
 
5 
 
5.3 
 
5.5 
     
 
Government 
debt 
 
 
109.4 
 
105 
 
100.4 
 
98.4 
 
96.4 
     
 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
 
 
0.6 
 
2.3 
 
2.9 
 
3 
 
3 
     
 
Italian stability programme (2004–08) 
General 
government 
balance 
   
 
– 2.9 
 
– 2.7 
 
– 2.0 
 
– 1.4 
 
– 0.9 
   
 
Primary 
balance 
   2.4 2.5 3.3 4 4.7    
 
Government 
debt 
   106 104.1 101.9 99.2 98    
 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
   
1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 
   
 
Italian stability programme (2006–11) 
General 
government 
balance 
     -4.4 -2.4 -2.2 -1.5 -0.7 0 
 
Primary 
balance 
     0.1 2.5 2.6 3.4 4.2 4.9 
 
Government 
debt 
     106.8 105 103.5 101.5 98.5 95.1 
 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
     1.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 
 
Italian stability programme (2007–11) 
General 
government 
balance 
       -2.6 -3.7 -3.3 -2.9 
 
Primary 
balance 
       2.5 1.3 1.9 2.6 
 
Government 
debt 
       105.9 110.5 112 111.6 
 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
       -0.6 -2 0.3 1 
 
 
           
 
 
           
 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Public expenditure effects on nominal GDP  
 
Dependent Variable: GDP1 (nominal index of GDP) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 76.18828*** 7.038606 
Tex(-1) 0.491754*** 5.899669 
R2 0.484723 
Obs.: 39, Sample (adjusted): 1999:02; 2008:4 
D-W stat: 1.400407; AIC 7.566932; F stat 34.80610*** 
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*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
Table 3. Public expenditure effects on real GDP 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP2 (real index of GDP) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 106.0451*** 28.53820 
Tex(-1) 0.163956*** 5.729890 
R2 0.470514 
Obs.: 39, Sample (adjusted): 1999:02; 2008:4 
D-W stat: 1.3988210; AIC 5.428578; F stat 32.83164*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
Table 4. Joint effects of public expenditure and revenues on nominal GDP 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP1 (nominal index of GDP) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 71.36942*** 6.310181 
Tex(-1) 0.321952*** 3.514355 
Rev(-3) 0.198156*** 2.704307 
R2 00.530097.797115; Adjusted R2 0.502455 
Obs.: 37; Sample (adjusted): 1999:04; 2008:4 
D-W stat:  1.969720; AIC 7.400598; F stat 19.17764*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
Table 5. Effects on real GDP of public expenditure financed through taxes 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP2 (real index of GDP) 
Variable Coefficient       t-statistic 
C 105.6890*** 27.75564 
Tex(-1) 0.104996*** 3.404221 
Rev(-3) 0.059835*** 2.425457 
R2 0.498782 
Adjusted R2 0.469298 
Obs.: 36; Sample (adjusted): 2000:01; 2008:4 
D-W stat 1.835883; AIC 5.223311; F stat 
616.91736*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
Table 6. Real effect of monetary policy strategy I 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP2 (real  index of GDP) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 10.62128*** 
 
3.430827 
GDP2(-1) 0.924243*** 38.34049 
Rep_rate(-2) -0.317137** -2.338799 
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R2 0.977134; Adjusted R2 0.975827 
Obs.: 38; Sample (adjusted): 1999:03 2008:4 
D-W stat 1.936779; AIC 2.234471; F stat 747.8319*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
Table 7. Real effect of monetary policy strategy II 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP2 (real  index of GDP) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 10.89945*** 
 
3.492447 
GDP2(-1) 0.924399*** 38.31560 
Eonia(-2) -0.303109** -2.321781 
R2 0.977089; Adjusted R2 0.975780 
Obs.: 38; Sample (adjusted): 1999:03 2008:4 
D-W stat 1.957125; AIC 2.236432; F stat 746.3319*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
Table 8. Real effects of public debt 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP2 (real index of GDP) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 19.96988*** 7.230646 
GDP2(-1) 0.772619*** 17.88903 
Debt(-1) 0.078703*** 2.755561 
R2  0.9839600; Adjusted R20.983158 
Obs.: 43; Sample (adjusted): 1998:02 2008:4 
D-W stat 1.634168; AIC 2.482092; F stat 1226.903*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level  
 
 
Table 9. The Kalman estimations 
 
 
 
Legenda 
GDP1 (nominal index of GDP) 
(rep_rate)  
1,tβ  2,tβ  
AIC=7.03 
Schwarz=7.07 
Obs. 38(Q) 
 127.03*
* 
(76.59) 
[ 0.000] 
-0.2865** 
(-11.29) 
[ 0.003] 
(Govern. 
Expenditure) 
 
1,tβ  2,tβ  
AIC=8.61 
Schwarz=8.65 
Obs. 39 (Q) 
 73.81** 
(6.687 ) 
[ 0.000] 
0.50111** 
(6.054) 
[ 0.000] 
*significant at the 0.05 level; 
**significant at the 0.01 level ;  
z-statistics in brackets; p-value in squared 
brackets 
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GDP2(real  index of GDP) 
Tex (nominal index of total expenditures) 
Rev (nominal index of total revenues) 
Rep_rate (repurchase rate) 
Eonia (Euro overnight index number) 
Debt (nominal index of public debt) 
 
 
